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Abstract
A New-Keynesian model with deep habits and optimal monetary policy delivers a fiscal multiplier above
one and the crowding-in effect on private consumption obtainable in a Real Business Cycle model à
la Ravn et al. (2006). Optimized Taylor-type or price-level interest rate rules yield results close to
optimal policy and dominate a conventional Taylor interest rate rule. Private consumption is crowded
out only if the Taylor rule is sub-optimal and then negates the fiscal stimulus by responding strongly
to the output gap, or if the ability to commit is absent. At the zero lower bound private consumption
is always crowded in across simple rules.
JEL classification: E30, E62.
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1 Introduction
The efficacy of a fiscal stimulus remains a controversial issue in applied macroeconomics. In particular
the range of empirical government spending multipliers is wide – Ramey (2011) surveys the literature and
argues that this is between 0.8 and 1.5 – and the sign of the effect on private consumption is controversial.
In fact, part of the empirical literature finds evidence for a crowding-out of consumption, while many
Structural Vector-Autoregressions (SVARs) provide evidence for a crowding-in effect. Canonical Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models typically predict fiscal multipliers well below the empirical
range and the crowding-out of private consumption.
A modelling device that has been used to obtain the consumption crowding-in and higher fiscal multi-
pliers in Real Business Cycle (RBC) models is the assumption that external ‘deep habits’ à la Ravn et al.
(2006) are formed in private and public consumption, i.e. habits on the average consumption level of each
variety of goods. Jacob (2011) shows that in a New-Keynesian (NK) model with deep habits, increasing
degrees of price stickiness soften the expansionary effects of a fiscal stimulus and may overturn the results
obtainable in a RBC model.
This paper also investigates these issues in a NKmodel with deep habits but pays particular attention to
the subtle interactions between fiscal and monetary policy that determine the outcome of a fiscal stimulus.
In particular, we study a boost to government spending alongside a number of possible interest rate
policies: first, the welfare-optimal (Ramsey) policy; second, a time-consistent policy; third, a conventional
Taylor interest rate rule which prescribes an immediate and strong response to the output gap; fourth,
an empirically based rule with a much weaker response to output; and finally an optimized simple Taylor
type rule (of which a price-level rule is a special case) that turns out to closely mimic the optimal policy.
We also examine the outcome of these simple rules with a zero lower bound constraint for an initial period.
2 Model
The model is a standard NK model with Rotemberg price stickiness and convex investment adjustment
costs augmented with deep habit formation.1
1To retain a sharp focus on the issue of deep habit we abstract from unemployment. A number of recent papers examine
fiscal multipliers having introduced Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching frictions into otherwise standard NK models (but
without deep habit) – see Campolmi et al. (2011); Faia et al. (2010); Monacelli et al. (2010).
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2.1 Households
A continuum of identical households j ∈ [0, 1] has preferences over differentiated consumption varieties
i ∈ [0, 1]. Following Ravn et al. (2006), households exhibit external deep habit formation in consumption,
i.e. on the average consumption level of each variety of good. Their optimisation problem is
max
{(Xct )j ,Kjt+1,Bjt+1,Ijt ,hjt}
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+sU((Xt+s)j , 1−Hjt+s),
subject to constraints
(Xct )
j + Ωt + Ijt +
Bjt+1
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Hjt +R
K
t K
j
t +
Rt−1Bjt
Pt
+
ˆ 1
0
Jitdi− Tt, (1)
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)Kjt + Ijt
[
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)]
, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, (Xt)j = X
(
(Xct )j , X
g
t
)
is a composite of habit-adjusted differen-
tiated private and public consumption goods similar to that in Pappa (2009), and Hjt are hours of work.
The private component of (Xt)j is
(Xct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(Cjit − θcScit−1)1−
1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (3)
where θc ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of deep habit formation on each variety, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of
habit in the consumption of good i, which evolves over time according to
Scit = $
cScit−1 + (1− $c)Cit, (4)
where $c ∈ (0, 1) implies persistence. The optimal level of demand for each variety, Cjit, for a given
composite is obtained by minimizing total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi over C
j
it, subject to (3). This leads to
Cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(Xct )
j + θcScit−1, (5)
where Pit is the price of variety i, Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η is the nominal price index and η is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution. Multiplying (5) by Pit and integrating, real consumption expenditure Cjt can
be written as a function of the consumption composite and the stock of habit: Cjt = (Xct )j + Ωt, where
2
Ωt ≡ θc
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt
Scit−1di. Households hold K
j
t capital holdings, evolving according to (2) where δ is the
capital depreciation rate, Ijt is investment, and S(·) represents an investment adjustment cost satisfying
S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0. Investment is also a composite of goods, i.e. Ijt =
[´ 1
0
(
Ijit
)1− 1η
di
] 1
1− 1η ,
but does not feature habit formation. Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of
private investment goods for each variety i:
Ijit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Ijt . (6)
Households buy consumption goods, Cjt , invest in investment goods, I
j
t , and nominal bond holdings, B
j
t ,
receive the hourly wage, Wt, the rental rate of capital, RKt , the return on nominal bond holdings, Rt, and
firms’ profits,
´ 1
0 Jitdi; and pay lump-sum taxes Tt.
The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to (w.r.t.) the private consumption composite (Xct )j
implies that the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint (1) is equal to Λjt = U
j
Xc,t,
where U jXc,t is the marginal utility of the private consumption composite. Let Λ
j
tQ
j
t be the multiplier on
the capital accumulation equation (2), and Qjt represent Tobin’s Q. Then, the FOC w.r.t. capital, K
j
t+1,
implies Qjt = Et
{
Djt,t+1
[
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Qjt+1
]}
, where Djt,t+1 ≡ β
UjXc,t+1
UjXc,t
is the stochastic discount factor;
the FOC w.r.t. investment Ijt yields
Qjt
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− S′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
+Et
Djt,t+1Qjt+1S′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)(
Ijt+1
Ijt
)2 = 1;
the FOC w.r.t. the bond holdings delivers 1 = Et
[
Djt,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
]
, where Πt ≡ PtPt+1 is the gross inflation
rate. Finally the FOC w.r.t hours implies: −U jH,t = U jXc,t WtPt .
2.2 Government
As in Ravn et al. (2006) deep habits are present also in government consumption.2 In each period t, the
government allocates spending PtGt over differentiated goods sold by retailers in a monopolistic market
to maximize the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good:
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git − θgSgit−1)1−
1
η di
] 1
1− 1η
,
2This can be justified by assuming that households derive habits also on consumption of government provided goods. One
can also argue that public goods are local in nature and households care about the provision of individual public goods in
their own constituency relative to others; or that procurement relationships are formed between government and firms.
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subject to the budget constraint
´ 1
0 PitGitdi ≤ PtGt, where θg is the degree of deep habit formation in
government spending and Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for this expenditure, which evolves as:
Sgit = $
gSgit−1 + (1− $g)Git, (7)
and exhibits persistence ρg. At the optimum
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt + θ
gSgit−1. (8)
Aggregate real government consumption, Gt, is an autoregressive process
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ 'Gt , (9)
where ρG is an autoregressive parameter and 'gt is a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation
σG. The government budget constraint is simply Gt = Tt.
2.3 Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] rents capital, Kit, and hires labour,
Hit to produce differentiated goods Yit with convex technology F (Hit,Kit), which are sold at price Pit.
Firms face quadratic price adjustment costs ξ2
(
Pit
Pit−1 − 1
)2
Yt, as in Rotemberg (1982) – where parameter
ξ measures the degree of price stickiness – and maximize the following flow of discounted profits:
Jit = Et

∞∑
s=0
Dt,t+s
 Pit+sPt+s (Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s)
−Wit+sPt+s Hit+s −RKt+sKit+s − ξ2
(
Pit+s
Pit+s−1 − 1
)2
Yt

 ,
with respect to Kpit+s, H it+s, Cit+s, Scit+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s and Pit+s subject to (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and the
firm’s resource contraint
Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s = F (Hit,Kit)− FC = Yit, (10)
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where FC are fixed production costs, set to ensure that the free entry condition of long-run zero profits is
satisfied. The corresponding first-order conditions for this problem are:
RKt =MCtFK,it,
Wt
Pt
=MCtFH,it,
νct ,=
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− $c)λct ,
λct = EtDt,t+1(θ
cνct+1 + $
cλct+1),
νgt =
Pit
Pt
−MCt + (1− $g)λgt ,
λgt = EtDt,t+1(θ
gνgt+1 + $
gλgt+1),
Pit
Pt
(Cit +Git)− ξ
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)
Pit
Pit−1
Yt + (1− η)
(
Pit
Pt
)1−η
It + ηMCt
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
It
−ηνct
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xct − ηνgt
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt + ξEtDt,t+1
[(
Pit+1
Pit
− 1
)
Pit+1
Pit
]
Yt+1 = 0.
Variables MCt, νct , λct , ν
g
t , λ
g
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (10), (5), (4), (8)
and (7) respectively. In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents the firm’s real
marginal cost.
2.4 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is set either (i) optimally as the solution to a Ramsey problem, in which the mone-
tary authority maximizes households’ welfare or (ii) to be welfare-optimal subject to a time-consistency
constraint or (iii) according to a Taylor-type interest-rate rule:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)]
, (11)
where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter and ρpi and ρy are the monetary responses to inflation
and the output gap;3 or (iv) as a price-level rule:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
; (12)
3Strictly speaking the output gap is YtY ∗t where Y
∗
t is the flexi-price output, not YtY¯ where Y¯ is the deterministic steady
state. However none of our results are significantly affected by this feature.
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Both sub-optimal and welfare-optimal forms of these simple rules are examined.
2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear. The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)2
Yt.
3 Functional forms
The utility function specializes as U(Xt, 1−Ht) =
h
X(1−")t (1−Ht)"
i1−σc−1
1−σc , where σc > 0 is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, and $ is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the consumption composite,
which in turn is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of private and public consumption with νx representing the
share of private consumption in the aggregate. Investment adjustment costs are quadratic: S
(
It
It−1
)
=
γ
2
(
It
It−1 − 1
)2
, γ > 0, while the production function is Cobb-Douglas: F (Ht,Kt) = (AtHt)αK1−αt , where
At is a labour-augmenting technology shock and α represents the labour share of income.
4 Parameter choice
Most parameter values are taken directly from the calibration exercise of Ravn et al. (2006): β = 0.9902,
α = 0.75, η = 5.3, δ = 0.0253, σc = 2, θc = θg = 0.86, ρc = ρg = 0.85, ρG = 0.9. Parameters $ and νx are
set to target h = 0.33 and G/Y = 0.20, respectively, at the steady state and the investment adjustment
cost parameter γ = 5 as estimated by Christiano et al. (2005). The Rotemberg parameter ξ is set equal to
25.304, which corresponds to Calvo contracts of an average duration of 3 quarters. For the conventional
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) there is no persistence (ρr = 0) and ρy = 0.5. Estimated Taylor rules typically
reveal considerable persistence and a less aggressive response to output: we choose an empirical rule from
Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) where ρr = 0.81, ρpi = 2.04, ρy = 0.08. The ‘quasi-empirical’ rule is a
compromise, i.e., the same ρr and ρpi, but ρy = 0.5 as in the conventional Taylor rule.
5 Results
We report the impulse responses to a government expenditure shock of size 1 percent of steady-state
output to be able to read the output response as a fiscal multiplier. First, Table 1 reports the rules set
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out in Section 2.4 and welfare outcomes compared with the optimal policy.4 There are four sources of
forward-looking behaviour in our model: the Euler consumption equation, investment, and habit in both
consumption and government services. This feature introduces a considerable degree of time inconsistency
into the optimal Ramsey policy as can be seen by the substantial welfare loss in percentage terms if
the monetary authority cannot commit to some form of interest rate rule. Our optimized simple rules
come very close (within 1%) of mimicking the welfare outcome of optimal policy. As discussed before, a
conventional Taylor rule involves an instantaneous and over-aggressive response to output compared with
optimized rules resulting in a significant welfare loss. The estimated empirical rule by contrast is much
closer to being welfare-optimal whilst the quasi-empirical rule is somewhere in between.
Rule [ρr, ρθ, ρy] Welfare Loss (%)
Optimal (Ramsey) not applicable 0
Time Consistent (TCT) not applicable 152
Conventional Taylor [0, 1.5, 0.50] 90.2
Empirical Taylor (SW) [0.81, 2.04, 0.08] 8.54
Quasi-Empirical Taylor [0.81, 2.04, 0.50] 24.7
Optimized Simple [1.00, 0.00587, 0.0137] 0.96
Optimized Price Level [1.00, 0.00635, 0.00] 0.97
Table 1. Optimal and ad hoc Monetary Rules Compared
Notes: The welfare loss is reported as a % increase of that under optimal policy. For integral simple
rules with ρr = 1, the rule is expressed as log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρr log
(
Rt−1
R¯
)
+ ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions (equivalent to fiscal multipliers) to a fiscal shock when
monetary policy is either ex ante optimal, time-consistent or conducted using either the optimized or
the conventional Taylor simple commitment rule reported in Table 1. We see that the model delivers a
fiscal multiplier above one for a prolonged period and the crowding-in effect on private consumption if
the monetary authority can commit to some ex ante optimal rule. If it cannot commit, then the model
provides some support for fiscal stimulus pessimism with a crowding-out effect on private consumption.
The same applies to a fiscal stimulus alongside the conventional Taylor rule.
4See Levine et al. (2008) for details of these three monetary policy regimes. Note that these optimized simple rules are
shock-dependent and here only apply to a fiscal shock with the assumed persistence. In a stochastic environment facing
many shocks they need to be redesigned and will be dependent on the relative persistence and variances of all shocks. It
then becomes important to estimate the model, including the properties of the shocks, before proceeding to the design of
such rules.
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Figure 2 compares the optimized simple Taylor-type rule (which gives outcomes almost identical to
both the optimized price-level rule and the Ramsey policy) with the two ad hoc rules with and without
the imposition of a Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint. The ZLB is imposed for an arbitrary number
quarters (four) following the approach of Cogan et al. (2010). In line with the results of Christiano et al.
(2009) and Woodford (2011) for a standard NK model, also in a NK model where habits are ‘deep’ a fiscal
stimulus is more expansionary at the ZLB. The highest output multiplication effect obtained under an
optimized simple rule is substantial.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that (i) for an empirically relevant degree of price stickiness, when a RBC à la Ravn et al.
(2006) is turned into a NK model and monetary policy is set optimally, the model delivers a fiscal multiplier
above one and the crowding-in effect on private consumption obtainable in a RBC; (ii) an optimized simple
Taylor-type interest-rate rule yield results close to optimal policy and dominates a conventional Taylor
rule; (iii) private consumption is crowded out and the fiscal multiplier experiences a sizeable contraction if
the Taylor rule negates the fiscal stimulus with an immediate and high response to the output gap that, we
show, is implausible from both a normative and positive perspective, or if the government cannot commit;
(iv) at the zero lower bound private consumption is always crowded in across all our simple rules.
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Figure 1: A government spending expansion under alternative monetary regimes
10
Quarters
Per
cen
tag
e d
evia
tion
s fr
om
 ste
ady
 sta
te
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
Output                   
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
Consumption              
5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
25
Investment               
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
Hours worked             
5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
Real wage                
5 10 15 20
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
Mark−up                  
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
Inflation                
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Net nominal rate (levels)
 
 
NO ZLB ZLB (4 quarters)
(a) Optimized Simple Monetary Rule
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(b) Empirical Taylor (SW) Rule
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Figure 2: A government spending expansion at the zero lower bound.
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Appendix (Not for Journal Publication)
Symmetric equilibrium
Ut =
[
X(1−()t (1−Ht)(
]1−σc − 1
1− σc
Xt =
{
ν
1
σx
x [Xct ]
σx−1
σx + (1− νx)
1
σx [Xgt ]
σx−1
σx
} σx
σx−1
UXc,t = ν
1
σx
x (1− $)X(1−()(1−σc)−1t (1−Ht)((1−σc)
(
Xt
Xct
) 1
σx
UH,t = −$X(1−()(1−σc)t (1−Ht)((1−σc)−1
1 = Et
[
Dt,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
]
Dt,t+1 = β
UXc,t+1
UXc,t
−UH,t = UXc,tWtPt
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
Qt = Et
{
Dt,t+1
[
RKt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
]}
Qt
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
)
+ Et
(
Dt,t+1Qt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2)
= 1
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
γ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
S′
(
It
It−1
)
= γ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
Ct = Xct + θ
cSct−1
Sct = $
cSct−1 + (1− $c)Ct
Gt = Xgt + θ
gSgt−1
Sgt = $
gSgt−1 + (1− $g)Gt
F (Ht,Kt) = (AtHt)αK1−αt
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Yt = F (Ht,Kt)− FC
FH,t = α
F (Ht,Kt)
Ht
FK,t = (1− α)F (Ht,Kt)Kt
RKt =MCtFK,t
Wt
Pt
=MCtFH,t
νct = 1−MCt + (1− $c)λct
λct = EtDt,t+1(θ
cνct+1 + $
cλct+1)
νgt = 1−MCt + (1− $g)λgt
λgt = EtDt,t+1(θ
gνgt+1 + $
gλgt+1)
Ct +Gt + (1− η)It + ηMCtIt − ηνctXct − ηνgtXgt + ξEtDt,t+1 [(Πt+1 − 1)Πt+1]Yt+1 − ξ (Πt − 1)ΠtYt = 0
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt
log
(
Gt
G¯
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
G¯
)
+ 'Gt
log
(
At
A¯
)
= ρA log
(
At−1
A¯
)
+ 'At
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= ρR log
(
Rt
R¯
)
+ (1− ρR)
[
ρΠ log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρY log
(
Yt
Y ft
)]
Steady state
H, MC and νx solve simultaneously:
Y = C + I +G+
ξ
2
(Π− 1)2 Y
C +G+ (1− η)I + ηMC I − ηνcXc − ηνgXg + ξD (Π− 1)ΠY − ξ (Π− 1)ΠY = 0
νx =
Xc
Xc +Xg
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while all other variables solve the following system of recurvive equations:
A = A¯
Π = Π¯
Q = 1
S = 0
S′ = 0
D = β
R =
Π
β
RK =
1
D
− (1− δ)
FK =
RK
MC
K
F (H,K)
=
1− α
FK
F (H,K) = A
(
1
MC
) 1
α
(
K
Y
) 1−α
α
H
K =
K
F (H,K)
F (H,K)
I = δK
FC = (1−MC)F (H,K)
Y = F (H,K)− FC
G =
G
Y
Y
Sg = G
Xg = (1− θg)G
FH = α
F (H,K)
H
14
WP
=MC FH
X =
1− $
$
W
P
(1−H)
Xc =
(
X
σx−1
σx − (1− νx)
1
σx [Xg]
σx−1
σx
ν
1
σx
x
)σx−1
σx
C =
Xc
1− θc
Sc = C
λc =
Dθc(1−MC)
1−Dθc (1− ρc)−Dρc
νc = 1−MC + (1− $c)λc
λg= Dθ
g(1−MC)
1−Dθg(1−ρg)−Dρg
νg = 1−MC + (1− $g)λg
UXc = (1− $)X(1−()(1−σc)−1 (1−H)((1−σc)
UH = −$X(1−()(1−σc) (1−H)((1−σc)−1
15
